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ABSTRACT
A workflow is a collection of steps that must be executed
in some specific order to achieve an objective. A comput-
erised workflow management system may enforce authorisa-
tion policies and constraints, thereby restricting which users
can perform particular steps in a workflow. The existence of
policies and constraints may mean that a workflow is unsat-
isfiable, in the sense that it is impossible to find an autho-
rised user for each step in the workflow and satisfy all con-
straints. In this paper, we consider the problem of finding
the “least bad” assignment of users to workflow steps by as-
signing a weight to each policy and constraint violation. To
this end, we introduce a framework for associating costs with
the violation of workflow policies and constraints and define
the valued workflow satisfiability problem (Valued WSP),
whose solution is an assignment of steps to users of mini-
mum cost. We establish the computational complexity of
Valued WSP with user-independent constraints and show
that it is fixed-parameter tractable. We then describe an
algorithm for solving Valued WSP with user-independent
constraints and evaluate its performance, comparing it to
that of an off-the-shelf mixed integer programming pack-
age.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
D4.6 [Operating Systems]: Security and Protection—Ac-
cess controls; F2.2 [Analysis of Algorithms and Prob-
lem Complexity]: Nonnumerical Algorithms and Prob-
lems; H2.0 [Database Management]: General—Security,
integrity and protection
General Terms
Algorithms, Security, Theory
Keywords
workflow satisfiability, parameterized complexity, valued
workflow satisfiability problem
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1. INTRODUCTION
It is increasingly common for organisations to comput-
erise their business and management processes. The co-
ordination of the tasks or steps that comprise a computerised
business process is managed by a workflow management sys-
tem (or business process management system). A workflow
is defined by the steps in a business process and the order in
which those steps should be performed. A workflow is exe-
cuted multiple times, each execution being called a workflow
instance. Typically, the execution of each step in a workflow
instance will be triggered by a human user, or a software
agent acting under the control of a human user. As in all
multi-user systems, some form of access control, typically
specified in the form of policies and constraints, should be
enforced on the execution of workflow steps, thereby restrict-
ing the execution of each step to some authorised subset of
the user population.
Policies typically specify the workflow steps for which
users are authorised, what Basin et al. call history-
independent authorisations [2]. Constraints restrict which
groups of users can perform sets of steps. It may be that
a user, while authorised by the policy to perform a par-
ticular step s, is prevented (by one or more constraints)
from executing s in a specific workflow instance because
particular users have performed other steps in the workflow
(hence the alternative name of history-dependent authoriza-
tions [2]). The concept of a Chinese wall, for example, lim-
its the set of steps that any one user can perform [3], as
does separation-of-duty, which is a central part of the role-
based access control model [1]. We note that policies are, in
some sense, discretionary, as they are defined by the work-
flow administrator in the context of a given set of users.
However, constraints may be mandatory (and independent
of the user population), in that they may encode statutory
requirements governing privacy or separation-of-concerns or
high-level organisational requirements.
It is well known that a workflow specification may be “un-
satisfiable” in the sense that the combination of policies and
constraints means that there is no way of allocating au-
thorised users to workflow steps without violating at least
one constraint. The workflow satisfiability problem is NP-
hard [24] although relatively efficient algorithms have been
developed on the assumption that the number of workflow
steps is much smaller than the number of users that may
perform steps in the workflow [7, 12, 18, 24]. Of course, the
objectives of the business process associated with a work-
flow specification can never be achieved if the specification
is unsatisfiable. Hence, it is interesting to consider an ex-
tended version of the workflow satisfiability problem that
seeks the “best” allocation of users to steps in the event that
the specification is unsatisfiable.
Accordingly, in this paper we study the valued workflow
satisfiability problem (Valued WSP). Informally, we as-
sociate constraint and authorisation violations with a cost,
which may be regarded as an estimate of the risk associated
with allowing those violations. We then compute an assign-
ment of users to steps having minimal cost, this cost being
zero when the workflow is satisfiable. In a sense, our work
is related to recent work on risk-aware access control [4, 5,
13, 20], which seeks to compute the risk of allowing a user
to perform an action, rather than simply computing an al-
low/deny decision, and ensure that cumulative risk remains
within certain limits. However, unlike related work, we focus
on computing user-step assignments of minimal cost, rather
than access control decisions.
Our main contributions are: to define Valued WSP
and determine its complexity; to prove that Valued WSP
is fixed-parameter tractable for weighted user-independent
constraints; to develop an algorithm to solve Valued WSP
with user-independent constraints; to provide a compre-
hensive experimental evaluation of our algorithm; and to
demonstrate that the performance of our algorithm com-
pares very favourably with an approach that uses the mixed
integer programming solver CPLEX. Our experimental eval-
uation shows our algorithm enjoys a substantial advantage
over CPLEX as the number of steps grows, with our algo-
rithm being able to deal far better with problem instances
containing more than 30 steps. Moreover, our algorithm is
far better at solving instances that are unsatisfiable – pre-
cisely those instances for which Valued WSP is relevant.
In the next section, we define Valued WSP, having re-
viewed relevant concepts from the literature, including the
workflow satisfiability problem and user-independent con-
straints. In Section 3, we prove that Valued WSP is
fixed-parameter tractable for user-independent constraints
and describe an algorithm based on the concept of a pat-
tern, which is, informally, a compact representation of a set
of similar plans for a user-independent constraint. In Sec-
tion 4, we present our experimental results. This section
also includes a method of representing Valued WSP as a
mixed integer programming problem, which may be of use in
subsequent research. We conclude the paper with a discus-
sion of related work, a summary of contributions and some
suggestions for future work.
2. BACKGROUND AND PROBLEM
STATEMENT
We first briefly summarise relevant concepts from the lit-
erature, including workflow authorisation schema, workflow
constraints and the workflow satisfiability problem (WSP).
We then explain how a constrained workflow authorisation
schema can be extended to assign costs to plans that do not
satisfy the schema’s policy and constraints. We conclude
this section with a formal definition of Valued WSP.
2.1 WSP
A directed acyclic graph G = (V,E) is defined by a set
of nodes V and a set of edges E ⊆ V × V . The reflexive,
transitive closure of a directed acyclic graph (DAG) defines
a partial order, where v 6 w if and only if there is a path
from v to w in G. We may write v > w whenever w 6 v.
We may also write v < w whenever v 6 w and v 6= w.
Definition 1. A workflow specification is defined by a
directed, acyclic graph G = (S,E), where S is a set of steps
and E ⊆ S×S. Given a workflow specification (S,E) and a
set of users U , an authorisation policy for a workflow spec-
ification is a relation A ⊆ S ×U . A workflow authorisation
schema is a tuple (G,U,A), where G = (S,E) is a workflow
specification and A is an authorisation policy.
A workflow specification describes a sequence of steps and
the order in which they must be performed when the work-
flow is executed, each such execution being called a work-
flow instance.1 User u is authorised to perform step s only
if (s, u) ∈ A.2 We assume that for every step s ∈ S there
exists some user u ∈ U such that (s, u) ∈ A (otherwise the
workflow is trivially unsatisfiable).
Definition 2. Let ((S,E), U,A) be a workflow authori-
sation schema. A plan is a function pi : T → U , where
T ⊆ S. A plan pi is complete if T = S.
Definition 3. A workflow constraint has the form
(T,Θ), where T ⊆ S and Θ is a family of functions with
domain T and range U . T is the scope of the constraint
(T,Θ). A constrained workflow authorization schema is a
pair ((S,E), U,A,C), where ((S,E), U,A) is a workflow au-
thorization schema and C is a set of workflow constraints.
Informally, a workflow constraint (T,Θ) limits the users
that are allowed to perform a set of steps T in any given in-
stance of the workflow. In particular, Θ identifies authorised
(partial) assigments of users to workflow steps in T . More
formally, let pi : S′ → U , where S′ ⊆ S, be a plan. Given
T ⊆ S′, we write pi|T to denote the function pi restricted
to domain T ; that is pi|T (s) = pi(s) for all s ∈ T (and is
undefined otherwise). Then we say pi : S′ → U satisfies a
workflow constraint (T,Θ) if T 6⊆ S′ or pi|T ∈ Θ.
Definition 4. Given a constrained workflow authoriza-
tion schema ((S,E), U,A,C), we say a plan pi : S → U is
valid if it satisfies every constraint in C and, for all t ∈ S,
(t, pi(t)) ∈ A.
In practice, we do not define constraints by enumerating
all possible elements of Θ. Instead, we define different fam-
ilies of constraints that have “compact” descriptions. Thus,
for example, we might define the family of simple separation-
of-duty constraints, each of which is represented by a set
1In this paper, the ordering on the steps is not consid-
ered. Prior work has shown that the ordering is irrelevant to
the question of satisfiability subject to certain assumptions
about the constraints [12], assumptions that are satisfied by
the constraints considered in this paper.
2In practice, the set of authorised step-user pairs, A, will not
be defined explicitly. Instead, A will be inferred from other
access control data structures. In particular, R2BAC – the
role-and-relation-based access control model of Wang and
Li [24] – introduces a set of roles R, a user-role relation UR ⊆
U ×R and a role-step relation SA ⊆ R× S from which it is
possible to derive the steps for which users are authorised.
For all common access control policies (including R2BAC), it
is straightforward to derive A. We prefer to use A in order
to simplify the exposition.
{t1, t2}, the constraint being satisfied provided t1 and t2 are
assigned to different users.
A constraint (T,Θ) is said to be user-independent if, for
every θ ∈ Θ and every permutation φ : U → U , φ ◦ θ ∈ Θ,
where
φ ◦ θ : T → U and (φ ◦ θ)(s) def= φ(θ(s)).
Simple separation-of-duty constraints are user-independent,
and it appears most constraints that are useful in prac-
tice are user-independent [7]. In particular, cardinal-
ity constraints and binding-of-duty constraints are user-
independent. In this paper, we restrict our experimental
evaluation to two particular types of user-independent con-
straints (in addition to separation-of-duty constraints):
• an at-least-r counting constraint has the form (T, r),
where r 6 |T |, and is satisfied provided at least r users
are assigned to the steps in T ;
• an at-most-r counting constraint has the form (T, r),
where r 6 |T |, and is satisfied provided at most r users
are assigned to the steps in T .
It is important to stress that our approach works for any
user-independent constraints. We chose to use counting
constraints because such constraints have been widely con-
sidered in the literature (often known as cardinality con-
straints). Moreover, counting constraints can be encoded
using mixed integer programming, so we can use off-the-shelf
solvers to solve WSP and to compare with the performance
of our bespoke algorithms.
We now introduce the workflow satisfiability problem, as
defined by Wang and Li [24].
Workflow Satisfiability Problem (WSP)
Input: A constrained workflow authorisation schema
((S,E), U,A,C)
Output: A valid pi : S → U or an answer that there
exists no valid plan
2.2 Fixed-Parameter Tractability of WSP
A na¨ıve approach to solving WSP would consider ev-
ery possible assignment of users to steps in the workflow.
There are nk such assignments if there are n users and k
steps, so an algorithm of this form would have complexity
O(mnk), where m is the number of constraints. Moreover,
Wang and Li showed that WSP is NP-hard, by reducing
Graph k-Colorability to WSP with separation-of-duty
constraints [24, Lemma 3].
The importance of finding an efficient algorithm for solv-
ing WSP led Wang and Li to look at the problem from
the perspective of parameterised complexity. Suppose we
have an algorithm that solves an NP-hard problem in time
O(f(k)nd), where n denotes the size of the input to the prob-
lem, k is some (small) parameter of the problem, f is some
function in k only, and d is some constant (independent of
k and n). Then we say the algorithm is a fixed-parameter
tractable (FPT) algorithm. If a problem can be solved using
an FPT algorithm then we say that it is an FPT problem
and that it belongs to the class FPT [14, 21].
Wang and Li observed that fixed-parameter algorithmics
is an appropriate way to study the problem, because the
number k of steps is usually small and often much smaller
than the number n of users.3 Wang and Li [24] proved
that, in general, WSP is W[1]-hard and thus is highly un-
likely to admit an FPT algorithm. However, WSP is FPT
if we consider only separation-of-duty and binding-of-duty
constraints [24]. Henceforth, we consider special families of
constraints, but allow arbitrary authorisations. Crampton
et al. [12] obtained significantly faster FPT algorithms that
were applicable to “regular” constraints, thereby including
the cases shown to be FPT by Wang and Li. Subsequent re-
search has demonstrated the existence of FPT algorithms for
WSP in the presence of other constraint types [9, 10]. Cohen
et al. [7] introduced the class of user-independent constraints
and showed that WSP remains FPT if only user-independent
constraints are included. Note that every regular constraint
is user-independent and all the constraints defined in the
ANSI RBAC standard [1] are user-independent. Results of
Cohen et al. [7] have led to algorithms which significantly
outperform the widely used SAT-solver SAT4J on difficult
instances of WSP with user-independent constraints [6, 18].
2.3 Valued WSP
There has been considerable interest in recent years in
making the specification and enforcement of access control
policies more flexible. Naturally, it is essential to continue
to enforce effective access control policies. Equally, it is
recognised that there may well be situations where a sim-
ple “allow” or “deny” decision for an access request may not
be appropriate. It may be, for example, that the risks of
refusing an unauthorised request are less significant than
the benefits of allowing it. One obvious example occurs in
healthcare systems, where the denial of an access request
in an emergency situation could lead to loss of life. Hence,
there has been increasing interest in context-aware policies,
such as “break-the-glass”, which allow different responses to
requests in different situations. Risk-aware access control is
another promising line of research that seeks to quantify the
risk of allowing a request, where a decision of “0” might rep-
resent an unequivocal“deny”and“1”an unequivocal“allow”,
with decisions of intermediate values representing different
levels of risk.
Similar considerations arise very naturally when we con-
sider workflows. In particular, we may specify authoriza-
tion policies and constraints that mean a workflow specifi-
cation is unsatisfiable. Clearly, this is undesirable from a
business perspective, since the business objective associated
with the workflow can not be achieved. There are two possi-
ble ways of dealing with an unsatisfiable workflow specifica-
tion:(i) modify the authorization policy and/or constraints;
(ii) find the “least bad” complete plan. Prior work by Basin,
Burri and Karjoth considered the former approach [2]. They
restricted their attention to modification of the authorisa-
tion policy, what they called administrable authorizations.
They assigned costs to modifying different aspects of a pol-
icy and then computed a strategy to modify the policy of
minimal cost.
We adopt a different approach and consider minimising
the cost of “breaking” the policies and/or constraints. (We
will compare our approach to Basin et al. in the related work
section.) Informally, given a workflow specification, for each
3The SMV loan origination workflow studied by Schaad et
al., for example, has 13 steps and identifies five roles [22]. It
is generally assumed that the number of users is significantly
greater than the number of roles.
plan pi, we define the total cost or weight associated with
the plan w(pi). The problem, then, is to find the complete
plan with minimum total cost.
More formally, let ((S,E), U,A,C) be a constrained work-
flow authorization schema. Let Π denote the set of all pos-
sible plans from S to U . Then, for each c ∈ C, we define a
weight function wc : Π→ Z, where
wc(pi)
{
= 0 if pi satisfies c,
> 0 otherwise.
The pair (c, wc) is a weighted constraint.
The intuition is that wc(pi) represents the extent to which
pi violates c. Consider, for example, an at-most-r counting
constraint (T, r). Then wc(pi) depends only on the number
of users assigned to the steps in T (and the penalty should
increase as the number of users increases). Let pi(T ) denote
the set of users assigned to steps in T . Then wc(pi) = 0 if
|pi(T )| 6 r; for plans pi and pi′, we have wc(pi) = wc(pi′) if
|pi(T )| = |pi(T ′)|; and 0 < wc(pi) ≤ wc(pi′) if r < |pi(T )| ≤
|pi′(T )|. Similarly, for an at-least-r constraint c with scope
T , we would have wc(pi) = 0 if |pi(T )| > r; for plans pi
and pi′, we have wc(pi) = wc(pi′) if |pi(T )| = |pi(T )|; and
0 < wc(pi) ≤ wc(pi′) if |pi(T )| ≥ |pi′(T )| > 0.
Then we define
wC(pi) =
∑
c∈C
wc(pi),
which we call the constraint weight of pi. Note that wC(pi) =
0 if and only if pi satisfies all constraints in C. Note also that
wC(pi) need not be defined to be the linear sum: wC(pi) may
be defined to be an arbitrary function of the tuple (wc(pi) :
c ∈ C) and Theorem 1 below would still hold. However,
we will not use this generalisation in this paper, but simply
remark that it is possible, if needed.
We next introduce a function wA : Π→ Z, which assigns
a cost for each plan with respect to the authorisation policy.
The intuition is that a plan in which every user is authorised
for the steps to which she is assigned has zero cost and the
cost of a plan that violates the policy increases as the number
of steps that are assigned to unauthorised users increases.
More formally,
wA(pi)
{
= 0 if (pi(t), t) ∈ A for all t,
> 0 otherwise
is the authorisation weight of pi.
The definition of wA can be arbitrarily fine-grained. We
could, for example, associate a weight ω(t, u) with every pair
(t, u), where a zero weight indicates that u is authorised for
t, and define
wA(pi) =
∑
t∈T
ω(t, pi(t)).
One particularly simple instantiation of this idea is to define
a single weight ω > 0 to be associated with every policy
violation. In this case, wA(pi) = aω, where a is the number of
steps that are assigned to unauthorised users. Alternatively,
we might distinguish between different types of users, so
that, for example, assigning steps to external contractors
is associated with a higher weight ωe than the weight ωi
associated with assigning steps to (internal) unauthorised
staff members.
We may now define the valued workflow satisfiability prob-
lem, which will be the subject of the remainder of the paper.
Valued WSP
Input: A constrained workflow authorisation schema
((S,E), U,A,C) with weights for constraints
and authorisations, as above.
Output: A plan pi : S → U that minimises
w(pi) = wC(pi) + wA(pi).
Before proceeding further, however, we introduce a weight
function that is more fine-grained than those considered
above, and the one that we shall use in the remainder of
this paper. Specifically, for each user u and each subset T
of S, we define a weight ω(T, u) ∈ Z, where
ω(T, u)
{
= 0 if (u, t) ∈ A for all t ∈ T ,
> 0 otherwise.
We call ω : 2S×U the (weighted) set-authorisation function.
Vacuously, we have ω(∅, u) = 0 for all u ∈ U . We write
pi−1(u) to denote the set of steps to which u is assigned by
plan pi. Then we define
wA(pi) =
∑
u∈U
ω(pi−1(u), u).
Clearly, this form of authorisation weight satisfies the re-
quired criteria.
We base wA on weights of the form ω(T, u) because, in ad-
dition to allowing us to specify weights for every pair (t, u) if
required, it allows us to express more complex (“non-linear”)
costs on plans. For example:
1. We can introduce a large penalty ω(T, u), effectively
saying we prefer not to involve u in steps in T . (We use
weights like this in our experimental work, described
in Section 4.)
2. We can define a limit ` on the number of steps that can
be executed by u, by setting a large penalty ω(T, u) for
all T of cardinality greater than `.
3. We can attempt to minimise the number of involved
users by giving a small penalty for assigning a user to
at least one step. This is similar to item 1 above, albeit
with a different goal.
4. The weights associated with the same user execut-
ing different steps may not increase linearly. Once a
user has performed one particular unauthorized step,
the additional cost of executing a related unauthorized
step may be reduced, while the additional cost of exe-
cuting an unrelated unauthorized step may be the same
as the original cost. Our formulation enables us to
model this kind of situation.
5. We can implement separation-of-duty on a per-user ba-
sis, which is not possible with user-independent con-
straints. In particular, it may be acceptable for u1 to
perform steps s1 and s2, but not u2, in which case
ω({s1, s2}, u1) would be small, while ω({s1, s2}, u2)
would be large.
The next claim is an important observation following di-
rectly from the definitions above.
Proposition 1. The optimal weight of an instance of
Valued WSP equals zero if and only if the corresponding
WSP instance is satisfiable.
3. SOLVING VALUED WSP WITH USER-
INDEPENDENT CONSTRAINTS
In Section 3.1 we introduce the notion of weighted user-
independent constraints and prove that Valued WSP
with only user-independent constraints is fixed-parameter
tractable (FPT). In Section 3.2, we describe an FPT algo-
rithm to solve Valued WSP with user-independent con-
straints.
3.1 Weighted User-Independent Constraints
and Patterns
A weighted constraint c is called user-independent if, for
every permutation θ of U , wC(pi) = wC(θ ◦ pi). Thus, a
weighted user-independent constraint does not distinguish
between users. Any (weighted) counting constraint for
which the weight of plan pi is defined in terms of the cardi-
nality of the image of pi is user-independent.
Given a plan pi : S′ → U , where S′ ⊆ S, the pattern
P (pi) of pi is the partition {pi−1(u) : u ∈ U, pi−1(u) 6= ∅}
of S′ into non-empty sets. We say that two plans pi and
pi′ are equivalent if they have the same pattern. If all con-
straints are user-independent and pi and pi′ are equivalent,
then wC(pi) = wC(pi
′). A pattern is said to be complete if
S′ = S.
Generalising the corresponding result for WSP with user-
independent constraints [7, Theorem 2], we can prove the fol-
lowing theorem, which uses weighted set-authorisation. The
proof uses ideas from [7] and [18]. We assume(i) that the
weight of each assignment can be computed in time polyno-
mial in the number of steps, users and constraints (denoted
k, n and m, respectively); (ii) we can determine whether a
plan satisfies a constraint in time polynomial in the number
of steps and users.
Theorem 1. Valued WSP in which all constraints are
user-independent can be solved in time 2k log k(k+n+m)O(1).
Thus, Valued WSP with user-independent constraints is
FPT.
Proof. For a positive integer x, let [x] = {1, . . . , x}. Re-
call that for equivalent complete plans pi and pi′, we have
wC(pi) = wC(pi
′). However, wA(pi) =
∑
u∈U wA(pi
−1(u), u)
is, in general, different from wA(pi
′) and so we must com-
pute the minimum value of wA(pi) among all equivalent com-
plete plans pi. To do so efficiently, for a complete plan pi,
we first construct a weighted complete bipartite graph Gpi
with partite sets [p] and U , where p = |P (pi)| as follows.
Let P (pi) = {T1, . . . , Tp}. The weight of an edge {q, u} is∑
s∈Tq ω(s, u).
Now observe that Gpi′ = Gpi for every pair pi, pi
′ of equiva-
lent complete plans and that wA(pi) equals the weight of the
corresponding matching of Gpi covering all vertices of [p].
Hence, it suffices to find such a matching of Gpi of minimum
weight, which can be done by the Hungarian method [19] in
time O(n3).
Observe that the number of partitions of the set [k] into
non-empty subsets, called the Bell number Bk, is smaller
than k! and there are algorithms of running time O(Bk) =
O(2k log k) to generate all partitions of [k] [15]. Thus, we can
generate all patterns in time O(2k log k). For each of them
we compute the corresponding complete plan of minimum
weight, and, among all such plans, we choose the one of
smallest weight. The total running time is O(2k log k(k+n+
m)O(1)).
Cohen et al. proved [7] that WSP with user-independent
constraints cannot be solved in time 2o(k log k)(k+n+m)O(1),
unless the widely believed Exponential Time Hypothesis4
fails. This and Proposition 1 imply that the FPT algorithm
of Theorem 1 is optimal, in a sense.
3.2 Pattern Branch and Bound
We present a branch-and-bound algorithm (Algorithm 1)
for the Valued WSP. This algorithm is inspired by the
Pattern Backtracking algorithm for the WSP [18]. However,
the original algorithm solves a decision problem, whereas the
Valued WSP is an optimisation problem. Thus our algo-
rithm for Valued WSP requires a completely different al-
gorithmic framework. We call our algorithm for the Valued
WSP Pattern Branch and Bound (PBB). Given a pattern
P , we will write T (P ) =
⋃
p∈P p to denote the set T ⊆ S on
which P is the partition.
Algorithm 1: Entry point of the PBB algorithm.
input : Valued WSP instance W
output: The optimal complete plan for W
1 λ← λ(W ), where λ(W ) is the global lower bound;
2 pi ← H(W ), where H(W ) is a Valued WSP heuristic;
3 return explore(∅, pi, λ);
Algorithm 2: Recursive procedure explore(P, pi∗, λ) of
the PBB algorithm.
input : Node P of the search tree; best plan pi∗ found
so far; the global lower bound λ
output: The best plan found after exploring this
branch of search
1 if P is a complete pattern then
2 Let pi′ be an optimal plan with pattern P ;
3 pi′′ ← arg minpi∈{pi′,pi∗} w(pi);
4 else
5 pi′′ ← pi∗;
6 Select s ∈ S \ T (P ) maximising I(P, s);
7 forall the extensions P ′ of P with step s do
8 if L(P ′) < w(pi′′) and w(pi′′) > λ then
9 Let pi′ ← explore(P ′, pi′′, λ);
10 pi′′ ← arg minpi∈{pi′,pi′′} w(pi);
11 return pi′′;
The general idea of the algorithm follows the proof of The-
orem 1. The algorithm explores the space of patterns with a
depth-first search and for each complete pattern P seeks an
optimal plan pi such that P (pi) = P (recall that such a plan
can be found efficiently). Each node of the search tree is a
pattern, with the root being an empty pattern and leaves
being complete patterns. In each non-leaf node P , the al-
gorithm selects a step s ∈ S such that s 6∈ T (P ) (line 6 of
Algorithm 2), and generates one child node for each possi-
bility to extend P with s (line 10). By extensions of P with
step s we mean patterns P ′ obtained from P by adding s to
one of the subsets p ∈ P or adding a new subset {s} to the
partition; hence, there are |P |+ 1 extensions of P .
4The Exponential Time Hypothesis claims there is no algo-
rithm of running time O∗(2o(n)) for 3SAT on n variables [17].
Like any branch-and-bound algorithm, PBB utilises a
lower bound L(P ) for pruning branches. The lower bound
L(P ) in a node P is computed as follows:
L(P ) =
∑
c∈C
Lc(P ) +
∑
p∈P
min
u∈U
ω(p, u) ,
where Lc(P ) is the lower bound of wc(pi), where pi is an
extension of a plan with pattern P . The implementation
of Lc(P ) depends on the constraint type. For example, for
a counting constraint c with the scope T and weight func-
tion wc(pi) = ωc(|pi(T )|), the lower bound can be computed
as Lc(P ) = l(q, a), where q = |{p ∈ P : p ∩ T 6= ∅}|,
a = |T ∩ T (P )| and l(q, a) is the following recursive func-
tion:
l(q, a) =
{
ωc(q) if a = |T |,
min{l(q, a+ 1), l(q + 1, a+ 1)} otherwise.
Other speed-ups implemented in the PBB algorithm in-
clude a global lower bound λ(W ) (line 1 of Algorithm 1)
and the heuristic H(W ) to obtain a good upper bound from
the very beginning of the search (line 2 of Algorithm 1).
In a simple implementation, the global lower bound λ(W )
could be a constant function λ(W ) = 0; that would termi-
nate the algorithm as soon as a complete plan satisfying all
the constraints and authorisations is found. The heuristic
algorithm can be as simple as a trivial plan assigning some
user to all the steps S.
In our implementation, however, we translate the Val-
ued WSP instance W into WSP instances and solve them
to obtain better global lower bound and upper bound. Let
WSP(W,x) be a WSP instance obtained from W by elimi-
nating all the constraints and authorisations with penalties
below x and converting the rest of the constraints and autho-
risations into hard constraints. By solving WSP(W,x) we
establish either the global lower bound or the upper bound.
If WSP(W,x) is unsatisfiable, we conclude that there ex-
ists no complete plan pi such that w(pi) < x and, hence,
λ(W ) = x. Otherwise, the plan valid in WSP(W,x) can be
used for an upper bound in W .
We start from solving the WSP(W, 1) and, if it turns out
to be unsatisfiable, we solve the WSP(W,M), where M is a
large enough number, which usually gives us a good upper
bound as it rules out plans that break highly-penalised con-
straints. We solve the WSPs using an improved version of
the WSP algorithm of [18].
The order in which patterns are extended (a step at a
time) makes no difference to the worst-case time complexity
of the algorithm but is crucial to its performance in prac-
tice [18]. It is defined by the ‘importance’ function I(P, s),
the intention being to focus on the most important steps as
early as possible to quickly prune fruitless branches of the
search. The importance of a step mostly depends on the con-
straints that include the step in their respective scopes. For
example, if a step is involved in several separation-of-duty
constraints, adding it to the pattern may significantly reduce
the search space and possibly result in increased penalties
for some at-most constraints. Another example is if most of
the steps of some constraint’s scope are assigned, and adding
the remaining steps to the pattern may have a severe effect
on the penalty for that constraint. The ‘importance’ met-
ric is context-dependent, i.e. the order of steps needs to be
determined dynamically in each branch of the search tree.
The ‘importance’ function I(P, s) is a heuristic expression
which we parametrised and optimised by an automated pa-
rameter tuning method. Our function I(P, s) takes into ac-
count the number and types of the constraints in which the
step is involved. In addition, it accounts for the constraints
with incomplete scopes. Finally, we check intersections of
‘conflicting’ constraints such as at-most and not-equals or
at-most and at-least.
As shown in the proof of Theorem 1, finding the optimal
assignment of users given a fixed pattern can be done in
O(n3) time (if computing wC(pi) takes O(n
3) time and com-
puting ω(T, u) takes O(n3/k) time). Each non-leaf node of
the search tree has at least two child nodes and, hence, the
size of the search tree is within O(Bk). Then the worst case
time complexity of the PBB algorithm is O(Bkn
3).
With the exception of the ‘step importance’ function
I(P, s), which is easy to adjust for any type of instances, and
the lower bound L(P ), our algorithm is a generic solver for
the user-independent Valued WSP. For example, it does
not exploit the specifics of the counting constraints which
could be used to preprocess problem instances [7]. This
shows that our approach is generic, easy to implement and
its performance can be further improved by implementing
instance-specific speed-ups.
4. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
The pseudo-Boolean SAT solver SAT4J has been used to
solve the WSP [24]. Recent work has demonstrated that a
bespoke pattern-based algorithm can outperform SAT4J in
solving WSP [6, 18]. Integer linear programming has been
used by Basin et al. to solve the allocation existence prob-
lem [2], which is related to Valued WSP. In this section,
we describe the experimental work on Valued WSP that
we have undertaken. In particular, we will compare the per-
formance of our PBB algorithm to that of the state-of-art
commercial MIP solver in our computational experiments
on Valued WSP. We first describe the problem instances
we used and how we represented Valued WSP as a mixed
integer programming (MIP) problem. We then present the
results of our experiments.
4.1 Benchmark Instances
We use a pseudo-random instance generator to produce
benchmark instances. Our generator is an extension of an
existing instance generator for WSP [18]. The parameters
of the generator are the number k of steps in the instance,
the not-equals constraints density d in the range 0–100%, the
multiplier α for the number of constraints and the seed value
for initialisation of the pseudo-random number generator.
The generator produces an instance with k steps and 10k+10
users: 10k employees U ′ and 10 external consultants U ′′.
The penalty for assigning steps T ⊆ S to an employee u ∈ U ′
is given by
ω(T, u) = |T ∩B| · 10 + |T \ (A ∪B)| · 106 ,
where A ⊂ S and B ⊂ S are selected uniformly at random
from S, with A∩B = ∅ and |A| being selected uniformly at
random from [1, d(k − 4)/2e], and |B| = 2. The penalty for
assigning steps T ⊆ S to an external consultant u ∈ U ′′ is
given by
ω(T, u) =

0 if T = ∅,
20 if T 6= ∅ and T ⊆ A,
106 · |T \A| if T ⊆ S \A,
106 · |T \A|+ 20 otherwise,
where A ⊂ S is selected uniformly at random having selected
|A| uniformly at random from [1, dk/4e].
Further, b(dk(k − 1) + 1)/2c distinct not-equals con-
straints are produced uniformly at random, each with
penalty 106 for assigning one user to both steps. Finally,
αk at-most-3 constraints and αk at-least-3 constraints are
generated uniformly at random. The scopes of all the at-
most-3 and at-least-3 constraints are set to 5 steps. The
at-least-3 penalties are defined as ωc(1) = 10
6, ωc(2) = 1,
ωc(3) = ωc(4) = ωc(5) = 0. The at-most-3 penalties are
defined as ωc(1) = ωc(2) = ωc(3) = 0, ωc(4) = 5 and
ωc(5) = 10.
The source code of our instance generator can be found
at [11].
4.2 Mixed Integer Programming Formulation
In order to use an MIP solver, we propose an efficient
MIP formulation of the Valued WSP. Note that the MIP
formulation is specific to the particular constraints present
in the instances, unlike the PBB algorithm. In this section
we describe an MIP formulation for the instances described
in Section 4.1.
Let C = C≤ ∪ C≥, where C≤ is the set of at-most-r con-
straints and C≥ is the set of at-least-r constraints. (Note
that not-equals constraints can be modelled as at-least-2
constraints with the scope of two steps.) For each constraint
c ∈ C we are given its scope Tc ⊆ S, the minimum (maxi-
mum, respectively) number rc of users that can be assigned
to c ∈ C such that the at-most (at-least, respectively) con-
straint c is satisfied and the penalty ωc(q) for assigning q
distinct users to Tc (note that ωc(rc) = 0).
For each employee u ∈ U ′ and each step s ∈ S \ A(u)
we are given an additive weight ωsu > 0 of assigning u to
s, which models the penalties for steps in both B(u) and
S \ (A(u)∪B(u)). For each consultant u ∈ U ′′ we are given
a set of steps A(u) ⊆ S, any of which can be assigned to u
for a penalty ωu > 0, and a weight Ωu > 0 for assigning a
step s ∈ S \A(u) to u.
The complete plan in our formulation is defined by binary
decision variables xsu, s ∈ S, u ∈ U . Variable xsu takes
value 1 if step s is assigned to user u and 0 otherwise. The
Valued WSP is then encoded in (1)–(14):
minimise
∑
c∈C≤
|Tc|∑
q=rc+1
(ωc(q)− ωc(q − 1))pcq
+
∑
c∈C≥
rc−1∑
q=1
(ωc(q)− ωc(q + 1))pcq
+
∑
u∈U′
∑
s∈S\A(u)
ωsuxsu
+
∑
u∈U′′
ωuzu +
∑
u∈U′′
Ωu
∑
s∈S\A(u)
xsu (1)
subject to∑
u∈U
xsu = 1 for s ∈ S, (2)
∑
u∈U
ycu −
|Tc|∑
q=rc+1
pcq ≤ rc for each c ∈ C≤, (3)
pcq − pc,q+1 ≥ 0 for c ∈ C≤ and q = rc + 1, . . . , |Tc| − 1,
(4)∑
u∈U
ycu +
rc−1∑
q=1
pcq ≥ rc for each c ∈ C≥, (5)
pcq − pc,q+1 ≤ 0 for c ∈ C≥ and q = 1, 2, . . . , rc − 2, (6)
ycu − xsu ≥ 0 for each c ∈ C≤, u ∈ U and s ∈ Tc, (7)
ycu −
∑
s∈Tc
xsu ≤ 0 for each c ∈ C≥ and u ∈ U, (8)
zu − xsu ≥ 0 for each u ∈ U ′′ and s ∈ A(u), (9)
xsu ∈ {0, 1} for s ∈ S and u ∈ U, (10)
0 ≤ ycu ≤ 1 for c ∈ C and u ∈ U, (11)
pcq ∈ {0, 1} for c ∈ C≤ and q = rc + 1, . . . , |Tc|, (12)
pcq ∈ {0, 1} for c ∈ C≥ and q = 1, 2, . . . , rc − 1, (13)
0 ≤ zu ≤ 1 for u ∈ U ′′. (14)
In addition to binary variables xsu, we introduce some
other variables. Binary variables ycu, c ∈ C, u ∈ U deter-
mine if user u is assigned to some steps in the scope Tc of
constraint c. Since ycu for c ∈ C≤ is minimised and it is
limited from below by binary expressions (7), its integrality
constraint can be waived. Since ycu for c ∈ C≥ is maximised
and it is limited from above by binary expressions (8), its in-
tegrality constraint can also be waived. Similar logic applies
to zu, which indicates if the consultant u ∈ U ′′ is assigned
any steps in B(u). Finally, we introduce the binary vari-
ables pcq for each c ∈ C and q ∈ N such that wc(q) > 0.
These variables are responsible for the constraint penalties
and (with appropriate limitations imposed on the instances,
as our instance generator does) the integrality of pcq and
constraints (4) and (6) can be waived.
The objective function (1) is the weight of the plan defined
by xsu, and thus our aim is to minimise it.
4.3 Experimental Results
We conducted a series of computational experiments to
test the performance of the Valued WSP solution meth-
ods. Our test machine is powered by two Intel Xeon CPU’s
E5-2630 v2 (2.6 GHz) and has 32 GB RAM installed. The
PBB algorithm is implemented in C#, and the MIP formu-
lation is solved with CPLEX 12.6. The source code of our
implementation of the Pattern Branch and Bound algorithm
can be found at [11]. In all our experiments, each solver run
is allocated exactly one physical CPU core. Each result is
reported as an average over 100 runs for 100 instances ob-
tained by changing the random generator seed value.
Main computational results are reported in Table 1. The
columns k, d and α indicate the parameters of the instances.
For each combination of parameters, 100 instances were gen-
erated. The column “Sat.” reports the percentage of the
instances that are satisfiable. The column w(pi) shows the
average weight of the optimal complete plans. The other
columns compare the MIP-based solver to the PBB algo-
Solved Time, sec wC(pi) wA(pi) Best w(pi)
k d α Sat. w(pi) PBB MIP PBB MIP PBB MIP PBB MIP PBB MIP
20 10% 0.50 100% 0.0 100% 100% 0.0 5.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 — —
20 20% 0.50 90% 0.4 100% 100% 0.0 19.8 0.4 0.4 0.0 0.0 — —
20 30% 0.50 37% 4.0 100% 100% 0.0 65.0 3.8 4.0 0.2 0.0 — —
20 10% 1.00 18% 4.4 100% 100% 0.1 556.0 4.3 4.2 0.1 0.2 — —
20 20% 1.00 0% 14.2 100% 100% 0.1 532.9 13.5 13.8 0.7 0.4 — —
20 30% 1.00 0% 24.3 100% 100% 0.1 469.9 23.4 23.5 0.9 0.8 — —
25 10% 0.50 100% 0.0 100% 100% 0.0 32.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 — —
25 20% 0.50 93% 0.4 100% 100% 0.0 102.2 0.4 0.4 0.0 0.0 — —
25 30% 0.50 27% 5.0 100% 100% 0.0 319.3 5.0 5.0 0.0 0.0 — —
25 10% 1.00 40% 2.3 100% 39% 0.3 ? 2.3 ? 0.0 ? — 4.1
25 20% 1.00 0% 14.3 100% 66% 0.8 ? 13.7 ? 0.6 ? — 14.9
25 30% 1.00 0% 29.9 100% 95% 2.0 ? 28.9 ? 1.0 ? — 29.9
30 10% 0.50 100% 0.0 100% 100% 0.0 72.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 — —
30 20% 0.50 88% 0.6 100% 99% 0.0 ? 0.6 ? 0.0 ? — 0.6
30 30% 0.50 24% 5.7 100% 99% 0.1 ? 5.7 ? 0.0 ? — 5.7
30 10% 1.00 6% 5.8 100% 3% 5.1 ? 5.7 ? 0.1 ? — 14.9
30 20% 1.00 0% 22.8 100% 7% 36.3 ? 22.4 ? 0.4 ? — 31.5
30 30% 1.00 0% 43.5 100% 31% 173.7 ? 43.2 ? 0.3 ? — 52.8
35 10% 0.50 100% 0.0 100% 100% 0.0 195.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 — —
35 20% 0.50 91% 0.4 100% 89% 0.2 ? 0.4 ? 0.0 ? — 0.6
35 30% 0.50 13% 7.7 100% 68% 18.5 ? 7.7 ? 0.0 ? — 8.0
35 10% 1.00 3% 6.2 100% 0% 64.7 ? 6.2 ? 0.0 ? — 33.5
35 20% 1.00 ? ? 92% 0% ? ? ? ? ? ? 29.6 130071.1
35 30% 1.00 ? ? 48% 0% ? ? ? ? ? ? 60.1 2990104.6
Table 1: Comparison of the PBB and MIP solvers, each being given one hour per instance A question mark shows that at
least one of the runs failed for the MIP solver.
rithm. Each of them is given one hour for each instance. The
“Solved” columns show the percentage of instances success-
fully solved within the one hour limit by each of the solvers.
The “Time, sec” columns show the average time taken by
each of the approaches. If at least one of the runs failed
for a solver, a question mark is shown in the corresponding
cell of the table. The wC(pi) and wA(pi) columns show the
components of the weight corresponding to the constraints
and the authorisations penalties, respectively. For those pa-
rameters where at least one of the runs failed, we use the
“Best w(pi)” columns to to report the average weight of the
best plan obtained by each of the solvers.
For each k, Table 1 includes a range of instances starting
from lightly constrained instances, which are mostly satisfi-
able, to highly constrained instances, none of which is sat-
isfiable. Naturally, the most interesting instances from the
perspective of Valued WSP are those that are unsatisfi-
able (since it is necessary to find an optimal plan of non-
zero weight for such instances). We are most interested in
the unsatisfiable instances with moderate weights of the op-
timal complete plans. A small weight w(pi) indicates that
only a few minor exceptions are needed to implement the
complete plan pi. With such a plan, it is easy to identify
the bottleneck of the problem and refine it or accept the ex-
ceptions to the constraints as the exceptions are likely to be
mild. The wC(pi) and wA(pi) columns show that in most of
the cases the authorisations were not broken. In fact, there
were only a few highly-constrained instances in which the
the optimal complete plans assigned some steps to consul-
tants, as the penalty for doing that is relatively high in our
instances.
The complexity of the instances depends to a great ex-
tent on the number of steps k and the parameters of the
instances. While small lightly-constrained instances can be
easily tackled by either of the solvers, other instances clearly
require an efficient algorithm. The MIP solver succeeds with
all the instances of size k = 20 but fails to solve many of the
larger instances within an hour. The PBB algorithm demon-
strates a much better performance, solving all the instances
of size up to k = 30 and the majority of the instances of size
k = 35. It is worth noting that the running time of the MIP
solver can reach 10 minutes for k = 20 while the PBB solver
solves all such instances within a fraction of a second.
Exact algorithms for solving hard optimisation problems
will, necessarily, take a long time to compute results for cer-
tain instances. However, such an algorithm may find an
optimum or near-optimum result long before the whole so-
lution space has been searched and can thus be used to com-
pute a reasonable solution for instances that do not run to
completion. The Best w(pi) column in Table 1 clearly shows
that MIP is far less suitable than PBB for this purpose.
To establish the practical limit on the problem size that
each of the solvers can tackle within a reasonable time, we
conducted another experiment to determine the number of
instances that the two solvers could solve given at most one
hour for each instance. Figure 1 shows the results of the
experiment. Each result is averaged over 100 experiments
for each instance.
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Figure 1: Comparison of the methods in terms of the ability to solve an instance within one hour
Figure 1a shows the performance of the methods on highly
constrained instances. Being given one hour, PBB solves
100% of the instances of size up to k = 32. In contrast,
MIP can only reliably manage instances for k ≤ 22, and for
k = 32 it fails to solve any instances at all. Figure 1b reports
the results of the same experiment but for less constrained
instances. The results are broadly similar, with PBB solv-
ing all the instances of up to k = 44, whereas MIP fails
for some instances when k > 24. This experiment shows
that the PBB algorithm significantly extends the range of
solvable instances of Valued WSP, something that will be
important for large real-world workflow specifications. Con-
sidering that the running time of each of the methods grows
exponentially with the size of the problem, large instances of
Valued WSP would require enormous computational power
to be solved with MIP, while the PBB algorithm tackles
them within minutes on a regular machine.
5. RELATEDWORK
Recent work on workflow satisfiability has borrowed tech-
niques from the literature on constraint satisfaction [7]. In-
deed, WSP may be regarded as a constraint satisfaction
problem, albeit with some unusual features which makes the
study of WSP of interest in its own right. Recent work in
the constraint satisfaction community has made a distinc-
tion between “hard” and “soft” constraints: the former must
be satisfied, while the latter may be broken provided the
“cost” of breaking the constraint is taken into account.
The valued constraint satisfaction problem, or VCSP for
short, was introduced by Schiex, Fargier and Verfaillie [23]
as a unifying framework for studying constraint program-
ming with soft constraints. The study of a special case of
VCSP, called finite-valued VCSP, was initiated by Cohen et
al. [8]. In this case, useful for many applications, all weights
are in Z (i.e., finite) and the objective function is the sum of
appropriate weights. Valued CSP has influenced our frame-
work for defining costs and Valued WSP.
Recent work on WSP introduced the notion of a pat-
tern for user-independent constraints, and bespoke algo-
rithms, optimised to solve WSP using patterns, have been
developed [7, 18]. The branch-and-bound algorithm in Sec-
tion 3.2 is influenced by the work of Karapetyan, Gagarin
and Gutin [18].
The most closely related work in the literature on access
control in workflows is that of Basin, Burri and Karjoth [2],
which considers the cost of modifying the authorisation pol-
icy when the workflow is unsatisfiable. They encode the
problem of minimizing this cost as a integer linear program-
ming problem and use off-the-shelf software to solve the re-
sulting problem. We tackle the problem of an unsatisfiable
workflow specification in a different way. We assume the
constraints and authorisation policy are fixed and instead
associate costs with breaking the constraints and/or poli-
cies. However, each violation will incur a cost and the goal
of Valued WSP is to minimise that cost. Thus our ap-
proach provides greater flexibility than that of Basin et al.:
we can break constraints as well as override the existing
authorisation policy. Obviously, there may be constraints
(arising from statutory requirements, say) that cannot be
broken. Violation of such a constraint is simply assigned
the maximum cost. And of course, we can always refuse to
implement a plan proposed by the algorithm.
Our work is also related to the growing body of research
on risk-based and risk-aware access control [4, 5, 13, 20].
In such approaches, the decision returned by policy decision
point for a given access request is not necessarily a simple
“allow” or “deny”. The decision may be a number in the
range [0, 1] indicating the risk associated with allowing the
request, which allows the policy enforcement point to allow
or deny the request on the basis of cumulative risk (either on
a per-user or system basis). The decision may also include an
obligation that must be fulfilled by the policy enforcement
point or requester to ensure that the risk is recorded and/or
mitigated appropriately.
There is little work in the security literature on risk-aware
workflows. One exception is the MRARD framework of Han,
Ni and Chen [16]. However, the emphasis of their work (and
of similar work in the business processing literature) is on the
modelling and computation of risk, rather than determining
an optimal assignment of users to steps in a workflow given
the risk metrics.
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS
We have established a framework that enables us to rea-
son about unsatisfiable workflow specifications by associat-
ing costs with policy and constraint violations. This, in turn,
enables us to formulate the Valued WSP, whose solution
provides an assignment of users to steps that minimises the
total cost of violations. We have developed a bespoke al-
gorithm for solving Valued WSP and shown that its per-
formance is far better than a generic solver, both in terms
of the time taken to solve Valued WSP and the range of
instances that can be solved in a reasonable amount of time.
There are several interesting possibilities for future work.
One obvious possibility is to move to a completely risk-based
approach for the assignment of users to steps in workflows.
Specifically, we retain the constraints but replace the au-
thorisation policy with a risk matrix, associating each user-
step pair with a risk. The goal would be to ensure that the
risk associated with a workflow instance remains below some
specified threshold.
A second possibility arises from the idea of associat-
ing each pair (T, u) with a cost, which provides the ba-
sis for an alternative “non-linear” approach to access con-
trol. Suppose that we consider a set of permissions P ,
as in conventional role-based access control, and we as-
sociate a cost ω(Q, u) with each pair, where u is a user
and Q is a subset of P . Given an RBAC policy, ex-
pressed as a user-role relation UA ⊆ U ×R and permission-
role relation PA ⊆ R × P , we write P (u) to denote
the set of permissions for which u is authorised: that is,
P (u) = {p ∈ P : ∃r ∈ R, (u, r) ∈ UA, (r, p) ∈ PA}. Then we
define the weight of the policy to be
wA(UA,PA) =
∑
u∈U
ω(P (u), u).
This then raises some interesting questions that may have
practical value. We might, for example, consider the follow-
ing problem: given inputs U , P , {ω(Q, u) : u ∈ U,Q ⊆ P}
and integer k, compute a set of roles of R of cardinality k
and relations UA ⊆ U×R and PA ⊆ R×P such that at least
one user is authorised for every permission and wA(UA,PA)
is minimised. Alternatively, we may insist that a user session
does not exceed a “budget”, where the cost of a session in
which user u invokes permissions Q is defined to be ω(Q, u).
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